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"Criminal prosecution is not about making an ideological point, whether
one agrees with it or not; that is for speeches and law review articles."'
-

Senator Patrick Leahy

I. INTRODUCTION

As of February 2002, more than half of the U.S. population was online,
with a rate of growth of Internet use of two million new users per month.2
Use of the Internet crosses economic, cultural, and educational lines, and
is increasing for people regardless of income, education, race, ethnicity,
or gender.' Its applications enhance many aspects of our lives, with an
expanding range of activities including such things as e-mail, searching for
product and service information, making online purchases, and searching
for health information.

1. Senator Patrick Leahy, Senate Judiciary Committee on Introduction of the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Tools Against Exploitation of Children Today Act, 24, (May 2002), availableat
http://www.cdt.org/legislation/107th/wiretaps/leahy.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
2. Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., A Nation Online:HowAmericans areExpanding Their
Use of the Internet 1 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/
anationonline2.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
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Unfortunately, while the Internet has unprecedented potential to
enhance our daily lives, there is also a dark side to the increased
communication that the Internet facilitates. Pedophiles and child molesters
are finding a new haven in the anonymous online world, and, because of
online computers, child pornography is now more readily available than
it has been since the late 1970s.' Additionally, advances in computer
technology have allowed the emergence of a new, related threat: virtual
child pornography.
This Article will explore the difficulties that the legislature has
encountered in its attempts to regulate virtual child pornography. The first
section provides a brief history of the case law surrounding the regulation
of child pornography. The second section explains how child pornography
has evolved in the face of advancing technology and how the ability to
create child pornography without the use of actual children (virtual child
pornography) has created problems in eliminating actual child
pornography. The third section outlines Congress's attempts to regulate
virtual child pornography and the obstacles that it has encountered
regarding the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The
fourth section critiques various suggestions as to how virtual child
pornography can be regulated without violating the First Amendment.
Finally, the fifth section offers alternative suggestions as to how virtual
child pornography can be regulated within the bounds of the U.S.
Constitution.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
A. Obscenity: UnprotectedSpeech
In order to understand the issues surrounding child pornography, it is
first necessary to understand the concept of obscenity. The First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech," 6 but
it has long been well-settled that obscenity is speech that does not enjoy
First Amendment protection.7 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that

5. KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 62 (Sept. 2001),
availableathttp://www.missingkids.com/enUS/ publications/NC70.pdf(last visited Oct. 4,2005).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) ("There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.").
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obscenity serves no essential part of any exposition of ideas and is of such
slight social value that any benefit in allowing obscenity is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' The difficulty,
however, has been in determining what exactly constitutes obscenity.
It was not until 1973, in Miller v. California, that the U.S. Supreme
Court directly addressed the "somewhat tortured history" of its decisions
regarding obscenity and formulated concrete standards establishing what
speech is to be considered obscene.9 The Court developed a test that
balances the societal value of a work against its prurient" appeal and the
offensiveness of the material in the community in which it appears. The
Court held that, when faced with the decision of whether a work is
obscene, the guidelines must be: whether the "average person, applying
contemporary community standards"" would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way," sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
However, even regulation of what is plainly obscene has its limits. In
Stanley v. Georgia, the Court was asked to rule on whether the private
possession of obscene matter could constitutionally be made a crime. 4 In
considering the constitutionality of such a regulation, the Court reasoned
that, regardless of the social worth of information and ideas, the right to

8. Id. at 572.
9. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973).
10. Id. at 24. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines "prurient" as "marked by or
arousing an immoderate or unwholesome interest or desire; especially: marked by, arousing, or
appealing to unusual sexual desire." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionarybook=- Dictionary&va=prurient (last visited Oct. 4,2005).
11. Miller,413 U.S. at 24. In requiring application of"contemporary community standards,"
the Court acknowledged: "It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City." Id. at 32. Likewise, requiring a jury to apply
contemporary community standards ensures that "so far as material is not aimed at a deviant group,
it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or
sensitive person - or indeed, a totally insensitive one." See id. at 33.
12. Id. at 24. The Court gave as examples of what a state statute could constitutionally define
for regulation, "[P]atently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal
or perverted, actual or simulated" and "[P]atently offensive representation or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." See id. at 25.
13. Id. at 24.
14. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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receive such information and ideas is fundamental to our free society. 5 In
this context, the Court held that the fundamental right to be free from
unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy precluded
criminalizing mere possession of obscene materials in the privacy of one's
own home. 6 To criminalize such possession would be to premise
legislation, aimed at controlling the public dissemination of ideas inimical
to the public morality, on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts, something that cannot be accomplished within the bounds of the
U.S. Constitution.17
B. ChildPornography:A Special Category of UnprotectedSpeech
Against this backdrop, the Court was asked in 1982 to decide whether
the distribution of pornographic images of children, which are not
necessarily obscene, can be regulated by a state within the bounds of the
First Amendment.' 8 In doing so, the Court held that child pornography
does not enjoy the constitutional protections afforded other types of
speech.' 9 The Court considered Congress's findings that the distribution
of child pornography was intrinsically related to sexual abuse of children
compelling. 2° Accordingly, states should be entitled to greater leeway in
regulation of child pornography based on their compelling interest in the
physical and psychological well-being of minors.2' The Miller standard of
obscenity was held to be inadequate since the question of a material's
obscenity bore no connection to the issue of whether there was physical
and psychological harm to the child involved in the production. 22 The
15. Id. at 564.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 566. In the words of Justice Marshall,
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds.
Id. at 565.
18. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
19. Id. at 756.
20. Id. The Court found that child pornography is related to sexual abuse of children in at
least two ways: (1) the materials produced create a permanent record of the childrens' participation
and the harm is exacerbated by circulation of the images, and (2) the distribution network must be
closed if production of material which requires sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively
controlled. Id. at 759.
21. Id. at 756-57.
22. Id. at 761.
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Court concluded that this issue of physical and psychological harm
overwhelmingly outweighed the exceedingly modest, if not de minimis,
value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of
children engaged in lewd sexual conduct.23 However, the type of offense
to be regulated under the Ferber analysis was limited only to visual
depictions of sexual conduct by children below a specified age.2"
Ferber only considered the question of whether the production and
distribution of child pornography could be constitutionally regulated by a
state. In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court extended the Ferber standard to
penalize individuals who possess and view child pornography in the
privacy of their homes.25 The Court found the state's argument that mere
possession of these images was damaging to children persuasive.
According to the state, possession of child pornography facilitated the
creation of a permanent record of a child's abuse and caused further harm
to children based on evidence that pedophiles use child pornography to
seduce other children into sexual activity.26 Decreasing demand for these
images would in turn decrease production.27 Accordingly, the Court held
the reasoning of Stanley did not apply to possession of child pornography
and that penalizing those who possess and view child pornography was
appropriate in light of the gravity of the interests involved in its
criminalization.28
1I. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE ADVENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY

A. The Battlefield: ChildPornographyand the Internet
While depictions of child pornography formerly appeared only in
photographs or videotape, they are increasingly appearing in computer or

23. Ferber,458 U.S. at 762.
24. Works that are not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performances or
photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retained First Amendment
protection. This makes sense when one considers that the interest that the Court found compelling
was the protection of actual children from the physical and psychological harm inflicted by the
production process. See id. at 764-65.
25. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1989).
26. Id. at 111.
27. Id. at 109-10.
28. In the words of the Court, "Stanley itself emphasized that we did not 'mean to express
any opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded
materials ... In such cases, compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual
to possess those materials."' Id. at 110.
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digital images that are sold, traded, bartered, exchanged, or simply
downloaded over the Internet.29 According to the U.S. House
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
(Subcommittee), among the principle channels for the distribution of child
pornography today are commercial web sites, Usenet newsgroups, and
peer-to-peer networks. 30 As part of their research, the Subcommittee used
KaZaA, a popular peer-to-peer file-sharing program and entered twelve
keywords associated with child pornography on the Internet.3 This search
identified 1286 items, with about 42% of those items being associated with
child pornography images.32
In the United States, child pornography is primarily a cottage industry
run by pedophiles and child molesters,33 the overwhelming majority of
whom are male. 4 With child pornography so readily available on the
Internet, it is possible for a pedophile or child molester to store a collection
in cyberspace and download it anytime he wants to view it.35 Furthermore,
the anonymity and availability of the online world draws these offenders
to online computers to communicate with other like-minded individuals in
order to validate their interests and behavior. 36 There is less risk of
identification or discovery online than in the real world; the offenders feel
protected, but they are able to get an immediate response from other
offenders as if they were meeting face-to-face.37 The same pictures are
reproduced and circulated again and again, and, as a result, more and more

29. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4 (2003).

30. Congressional Testimony ofLinda Koontz, Director for Information Management Issues,
U.S. General Accounting Office, regarding Online Pornography (May 6, 2004), 2004 WL 1047304.

31. Id.
32. Id. Since the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) started
tracking reports to the CyberTipline of child pornography on peer-to-peer networks in 2001, such
reports have increased fivefold. Id.
33. LANNING, supra note 5, at 63.
34. Kenneth Wooden, A Profile of the Child Molester, available at http://www.childlures.

com/research/molester.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
35. LANNING, supra note 5, at 62.
36. A chilling example is the Wonderland Club, an Internet child pornography ring that
involved 107 men across 12 countries, and whose chairman was an American. By the time the

network was cracked in 1998, police had found a total of 750,000 images ofchildren. The two main
rules of membership were that each member was required to (1) possess at least 10,000 images of
pre-teen children and (2) agree to exchange them with other members. CNN.com, Police Crack
Global Child Porn Ring, (Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001I/WORLD/
urope/K/1/0/london.porn (last visited Aug. 31, 2005); see also LANNING, supra note 5, at 95.
37. LANNING, supra note 5, at 95.
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child pornography is being found in digital format on computers and
disks.38
In the wake of Ferber,much of the child pornography industry was
driven underground, but, with the advent of the Internet, it appears profitmotivated child pornography distribution has returned and is growing.39
The risks associated with distribution through ordinary channels, which are
usually very high, are not an issue for commercial dealers or common
criminals on the Internet. In this context, although profit is an important
motive, most distributors are usually active sexual molesters themselves.4 °
B. The Battle Lines are Pixilated Virtual ChildPornography
Virtual child pornography is child pornography created with computer
software that does not involve the depiction of actual children. 4 Since
most trade and distribution of child pornography is taking place over the
Internet, both real and virtual images end up in digital format on
possessors' hard drives. When Congress investigated the issue, it found
that new photographic and computer imaging technologies make it
possible to produce visual depictions of what appear to be children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct that are virtually indistinguishable
from unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in such
conduct.42 The concern was that these images, while not involving the use
of actual children in their production, would still cause sufficient harm to
actual children to justify banning them in the same way as actual child
pornography.43 The problem, however, was that the Ferberstandard could
not extend to virtual child pornography because Ferberonly addressed the
issue of "live performances" and the visual recordation of such, since the
technology for creating virtual child pornography did not exist in 1982."

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 65.
S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2 (1996).
Id.
See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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IV. CONGRESS GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE: THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

PREVENTION ACT OF 199645

A. Congress 's Findings
In order to combat what Congress saw as a threat to our nation's
children, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced the Child Pornography
Prevention Act (CPPA) on September 13, 1995.46 Since virtual child
pornography does not involve the exploitation of actual children in its
production, Congress's primary concern was with the secondary effects
that virtual child pornography might have, both on children and on those
who would abuse them. The result of Congress's investigation was
disturbing. Congress found that the effect of visual depictions of child
sexual activity on a child molester or pedophile is the same whether the
child pornography is made using actual children or consists of images
which are virtually indistinguishable from photographic images of real
children.4 7

Congress came to the conclusion that the prohibition of possession and
viewing of any form of child pornography, including virtual child
pornography, would encourage possessors to rid themselves of it or
destroy it, thus eliminating the market for sexual exploitative use of
children.48 Furthermore, prohibiting possession of these images was
necessary since possessors of child pornography could use the defense that
the images were created without the use of actual children in every child
exploitation/pornography prosecution, a situation that would severely
hamper the ability to prosecute genuine offenders.49 A flood of computer45. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
46. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 8.
47. The dangers to children are just as great whether the images are virtual or real. Virtual
child pornography is often used to seduce children into sexual activity; it enflames the desires of
those who prey on children such that it increases the creation and distribution of child pornography
and the sexual abuse and exploitation of actual children; it is used to stimulate and whet the sexual
appetites of abusers, and serves as a model for sexual acting out with children; it desensitizes the
viewer of the images to the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children, so that it can
become acceptable and even preferred by the viewer; it has a deleterious effect on all children
because it encourages a societal perception of children as sexual objects, creating an unwholesome
environment affecting the psychological, mental, and emotional development of children, and
undermining efforts of parents and families to encourage the same. See id. at 2.
48. Id. at 3.
49. As Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Di Gregory testified,
If the government must continue to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that mailed
photos, smuggled magazines or videos, traded pictures, and computer images
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generated images into the market would make the situation even worse. As
technology progresses and it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish images of real children from images of virtual children, it
would also become almost impossible for the government to meet the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the images involve real
children.50
B. The CPPA is Enacted
It was in response to these findings that Congress enacted the CPPA.
Under the CPPA, the definition of child pornography was extended to
cover "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video,
picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture"'" that "is, or
appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."52 This
definition allowed images to be banned as child pornography regardless
of whether the images were of real children or of virtual children.53 The
CPPA also included the following pandering provision: any sexually
explicit image that was "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" that it depicted
"a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct" was banned.54
Additionally, for non-possession offenses, the CPPA provided an
affirmative defense that shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to
prove that the materials in question were (1) produced using only adults,
and (2) were not otherwise distributed in a manner conveying the
impression that they were images of real children.55

being transmitted on the Internet, are indeed actual depictions of an actual minor
engaging in the sex portrayed, then there would be a built-in reasonable doubt
argument in every child exploitation/pornography prosecution.
Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 20.
51. The pertinent statute amended by the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 was
Definitions for Chapter 110 of the U.S. Code, Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children,
18 U.S.C. § 2256 (1996).
52. Id. § 2256(8)(B).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 2256(8)(D).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (1996).

20051
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C. US. Supreme Court Smackdown: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
Five years after the CPPA was signed into law, a trade association for
the adult-entertainment industry challenged the law's constitutionality. 6
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, which held the CPPA
to be unconstitutionally overbroad and in violation of the First
Amendment. 7 In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that Congress
was attempting to extend the reach of its holding in Ferberto encompass
images that did not exploit children in the production process. 8 The Court
further noted that because Congress made no attempt to conform to the
Miller standard of obscenity, the statute would reach visual depictions
involving what appeared to be minors engaged in sexual activity even if
the works had redeeming social value. 9 The Court found this particularly
troubling, since the idea of teenagers engaging in sexual activity was not
only a fact of modem society, but had also been a theme in art and
literature throughout the ages. 60
The majority rejected Congress's findings that virtual child
pornography could lead to actual instances of child abuse, a compelling
interest that would have justified its total ban, since the Court found the
causal link to be contingent and indirect.61 It concluded that the harm did
not necessarily follow from the speech, but depended upon some
unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts. 62 The Court also noted
that in Ferber, the same virtual images prohibited by the CPPA were
considered an alternative and permissible means of expression if they were
necessary for a work's literary or artistic value.6 3
The Court also rejected Congress's assertion that the possibility of
producing images by using computer imaging made it very difficult to
prosecute those who produce pornography using real children. 4 The Court
held that the prohibition of virtual child pornography for the purpose of
banning child pornography using actual children "turns the First
56. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 243 (2002).
57. Id. at 258.
58. Id. at 240.
59. Id. Specifically, the "appears to be" language of§ 2256(8)(B) would allow the statute to
reach such critically acclaimed movies as "Traffic" and "American Beauty," as well as adaptations
of classic literature such as "Romeo and Juliet." See id. at 247-48.
60. Id. at 246.
61. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250.
62. Id. "The mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason
for banning it. The government 'cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of
controlling a person's private thoughts."' Id.at 253 (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 254-55.
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Amendment upside down."65 Based upon the overbreadth doctrine, the
Court pointed out that the opposite was true: banning unprotected speech
was prohibited if doing so would cause a substantial amount of protected
speech to be prohibited or chilled in the process.6 6 Nor could Congress
cure this overbreadth through the inclusion of the affirmative defense in
§ 2252A(c). 67 The Court considered the defense to be incomplete and
insufficient, since a person who was charged only with possession, as
opposed to distribution, of virtual child pornography would not be able to
avail himself of the affirmative defense. The defense also provided no
protection to persons who produced images using purely computer
imaging without the use of youthful adults as actors.68
Finally, the Court rejected the pandering provision as set forth in §
2256(8)(D).69 In prohibiting sexually explicit materials that "convey the
impression" that they depict minors, even films that contain no sexually
explicit scenes involving minors could be treated as child pornography if
the title and trailers conveyed the impression that those scenes would be
found in the movie.70 In addition, the provision not only prohibited
pandering, but also prohibited possession of material that was described,
or pandered, as child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution
chain.7' This would affect a possessor even if the possessor knew that the
material had been mislabeled and did not contain sexually explicit scenes
involving minors.72 The Court did, however, leave open the possibility that
a more complete affirmative defense could save the statute's
constitutionality.73
1. The Concurring Opinions: Justice Thomas
While Justice Thomas agreed with the majority in principle, he felt that
the government would have a compelling interest in banning virtual child
pornography if it could prove the "hindering prosecution" rationale.74 At
the time Ashcroft was decided, the government asserted that defendants
would raise the defense that the images are not of real children, not that

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 255.
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 257.
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 259.
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defendants had already done so successfully. 75 However, if in the future
they were to do so, Thomas explained, "the Government should not be
foreclosed from enacting a regulation of virtual child pornography that
contains an appropriate affirmative defense or some other narrowly drawn
restriction."76 Justice Thomas specifically asserted that "if technological
advances thwart prosecution of unlawful speech, the government may well
have a compelling interest in barring or otherwise regulating some narrow
category of lawful speech in order to enforce laws against pornography
made through the abuse of real children." 7
2. The Concurring Opinions: Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the ban on "youthfuladult pornography," or pornography produced using adults that look like
minors, was overbroad.78 However, she did not agree with the majority that
the ban on "virtual-child pornography" was likewise overbroad.79
O'Connor would have construed the "appears to be" language narrowly,
such that she would only have struck down the prohibition as it applied to
"youthful-adult pornography" and would have left the rest of the statute
intact.80 O'Connor found Congress's findings regarding the secondary
effects of virtual child pornography persuasive; specifically, that such
images "whet the appetites of child molesters.., who may use the images
to seduce young children."'" She was also far more concerned than the
majority that defendants indicted for offenses related to actual child
pornography could evade liability by claiming that the images are
computer-generated. 8 2 Since O'Connor found that the government had a
compelling interest, her conclusion was that the "appears to be ...of'

language should be interpreted as "virtually indistinguishable from;" this
narrow interpretation would avoid constitutional problems such as
overbreadth and lack of narrow tailoring.83

75. Id.
76. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 259.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 261.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 263.
82. Although it may have been true that no defendant had done so successfully at the time
of the decision, O'Connor pointed out that "[the] Court's cases do not require Congress to wait for
harm to occur before it can legislate against it." Id. at 263-64.
83. Id.at 264-65.
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3. The Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined in part by Justice Scalia, would have
deferred to Congress's findings." The Chief Justice pointed out that the
Court normally does not strike down a statute on First Amendment
grounds "when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the
challenged statute.""5 Looking at the plain text of the statute in regard to
its definition of "sexually explicit conduct," 6 and given Congress's intent,
the CPPA could easily be limited so as not to reach any material that was
not already unprotected before the CPPA was enacted. 7 Such graphic
language could not be expected to extend to works that involve youthfuladult actors squirming under a blanket and looking at Congress's findings
would show that this was never an intended result.88 Nor was this the
impression that film-makers had of the statute, as its existence did nothing
to chill the production of such movies as "Traffic" and "American
Beauty." In essence, the dissent took a common sense approach to the
manner in which the statute should be construed and would have upheld
the statute in its entirety.89
4. A Reasonable Outcome?
It is hard to understand the majority's reasoning given the sensible
arguments of Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist. The crux of
the majority's holding was that you cannot ban unprotected speech if a
substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the
process. 90 That argument made no sense in this case. The majority did not
determine that there was an actual chilling effect on the works referred to
in support of its holding, nor did it point to an actual chilling effect on
other protected works of literary or artistic value. If that was the case, then
the Chief Justice was correct and the Court's holding in Broadrickshould
have been controlling. 9' Common sense and a simple reading of
Congress's findings should have been more than adequate to reach the

84. Id. at 267.
85. Id. at 268 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
86. "[A]ctual or simulated... sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, analgenital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; ... bestiality;...
masturbation;... sadistic or masochistic abuse; or ... lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (2000).
87. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 268.
88. Id. at 269-70.
89. Id. at 260.
90. Id. at 255.
91. See supratext accompanying note 85.
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conclusion that the CPPA would never have been applied to works of
literary and artistic value.
Furthermore, in its decision in Osborne, the Court specifically found
that the evidence was compelling that pedophiles use child pornography
to seduce other children into sexual activity.9" Yet the majority rejected the
same findings in Ashcroft; why this happened is not at all clear from the
text of the majority opinion. If anything, Justice O'Connor's well-reasoned
concurrence should have reminded the majority of the extent of a state's
compelling interest in the welfare of its children. If the majority's primary
goal was to protect the idea of teenage sexuality in works of artistic or
literary merit, then adopting Justice O'Connor's narrow interpretation of
the statute would have served that purpose without necessitating a
complete rejection of Congress's findings and intent."
D. Congress Tries Again: The PROTECTAct
1. A Quick Response
As one would expect, the Court's decision was met with some amount
of disbelief by members of Congress.94 In direct response to the Court's
ruling, Senator Orrin Hatch, the original sponsor of the CPPA, sponsored
new legislation that would address the problems with virtual child
pornography in a manner consistent with the Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment.95 The resulting legislation, known as the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003 (PROTECT), was signed into law on April 30, 2003, one year
after the Court struck down the CPPA. 96 The goal of the new legislation
was to strike a necessary balance between the government's compelling
interest in protecting children from harm and the interest in safeguarding
First Amendment rights.9 7

92. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1989).
93. See supra text accompanying note 83.
94. In the words of Senator Orrin Hatch, "While I respect the Court's role in reconciling the
values of our Constitution with the values embodied in legislation, it is difficult to comprehend how
these sickening materials can be found worthy of Constitutional protection." Orrin G. Hatch, Child
Pornography:An Unspeakable Crime Augmented by the Court, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 401, 402 (2004).
95. Id. at 404.
96. Id.
97. Jim Abrams, Senate OKs Bill to Fortify ChildPornographyLaw, THE COLUMBIAN, Feb.
25, 2003, availableat 2003 WL 6678741 (2003).
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2. Change in Justification for the Law
In its findings accompanying the new bill, Congress abandoned the
secondary effects argument, upon which it had relied so heavily when it
enacted the CPPA. Instead, Congress focused on the problem of the virtual
child pornography defense and its impact on the ability to prosecute child
pornographers.98 In the Senate Report that accompanied this bill, rather
than including a vague warning that a virtual defense could be used to
hinder prosecutions as Congress had earlier done, actual post-Ashcroft
cases in which the virtual child pornography defense was successfully
utilized were cited. 99
As further proof that the threat of hindering prosecutions was real, the
Report relied on the testimony of the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (NCMEC) given before the House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Crime (Subcommittee) during hearings
regarding PROTECT. l°° Two important facts were presented. First, the
NCMEC assembled a photographic array containing both real and virtual
pictures and presented them to the Subcommittee. 0°' According to the
Subcommittee's findings, an ordinary person looking at the pictures would
be "hard-pressed" to distinguish between the real and virtual depictions.0 2
Second, the NCMEC testified that, in the wake of Ashcroft, prosecutors
from across the country were threatening to dismiss pending child
pornography prosecutions unless NCMEC could identify the children
contained in the charged images. 3 In fact, according to NCMEC, many
prosecutions were dismissed as a result."°
Even more disturbing were Congress's findings that the defense, while
effective, was also "illusory."'0 5 According to industry experts, while the
technology existed to create images that were totally virtual, creation of
such images was both time-consuming and, for now, prohibitively costly
to produce. 0 6 This being the case, the overwhelming majority of child

98. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4 (2003).
99. Id. Without legislation, the Committee explained, the Ashcroft decision "invites all child
porn defendants, even those who exploit real children, to assert a 'virtual porn' defense in which
they claim that the material at issue is not illegal because no real child was used in its creation." Id.
at 5 (quoting Sen. Patrick Leahy, co-sponsor of the PROTECT Act).
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 5.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 6.
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pornography did indeed depict actual children as it was more cost-effective
to use actual children.'17 Despite this fact, the mere existence of virtual
child pornography as a defense had two important consequences: (1) it
provided a "ready defense" against prosecution under laws against
sexually explicit depictions of actual minors and (2) it encouraged
producers and distributors to alter the images of "actual children in slight
ways to make them not only unidentifiable, but also appear as if they were
virtual creations" - a process that was neither difficult nor expensive.° 8
3. What Does the New Law Do Differently?
The first change the new law made dealt with the definition of child
pornography from § 2256(8)(D) that the Court found so troubling in
Ashcroft. In order to narrow this definition of virtual child pornography,
§ 2256(8)(D) was deleted. When the images in question were digital
images, computer images, or computer-generated images, the new §
2256(8)(B) replaced "appears to be" of a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct with "is indistinguishable from" a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.'09 Congress further narrowed this definition by
defining "sexually explicit conduct," as used in this provision, as conduct
that is "graphic," thus limiting that part of the statute to only what could
be considered "hard-core" pornographic images." 0 These limitations
107. Id.
108. S. REP.No. 108-2, at 6.
109. In the amended version of§ 2256(8), the virtual child pornography language was changed
to read:
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by
electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where... (B)
such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated
image that is, or is indistinguishablefrom, that of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). "Indistinguishable" is defined as "virtually
indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would
conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct." The
definition specifically excludes drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or
adults. Id. § 2256(11).
110. See id. § 2256 (2)(B).
For purposes of subsection (8)(B) of this section, "sexually explicit conduct"
means - (i) graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital,
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex,
or lascivious simulated sexual intercourse where the genitals, breast or pubic area
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attempted to address the Court's overbreadth concerns, since movies such
as "American Beauty," "Traffic," and adaptations of "Romeo and Juliet,"
while containing depictions that may be indistinguishable from actual
minors engaged in sexual conduct, would not be covered under the
definition of "graphic" sexual conduct.
Congress also addressed the Court's concerns regarding the pandering
provision of the CPPA by removing the provision from the definition of
child pornography and creating a specific section to deal solely with the
pandering issue.I"' Removing the pandering provision from the definitions
section and using language that targets only the act of pandering remedies
the problem of penalizing individuals further down the distribution chain
who know that the images are not child pornography.' 12 Furthermore, the
pandering provision narrows the language of the statute to address only
virtual images of sexually explicit conduct that are knowingly advertised,
promoted, presented, distributed, or solicited in a manner that reflects the
belief, or are intended to cause another to believe, that they are obscene. 3
This eliminates the problems surrounding promotion of such movies as
"American Beauty" or "Traffic" which use youthful actors to portray
teenagers in sexual situations.
Finally, while the Court held open the possibility that an appropriate
affirmative defense might save the statute, it found the affirmative defense
in the CPPA to be "incomplete and insufficient" in that it allowed
conviction even if the alleged pornography was created without

of any person is exhibited; (ii) graphic or lascivious simulated; (I) bestiality; (II)
masturbation; or (III) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (iii) graphic or simulated
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.
Id.; see also id. § 2256(10): "' [G]raphic,' when used with respect to a depiction of sexually explicit
conduct, means that a viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area of any depicted
person or animal during any part of the time that the sexually explicit conduct is being depicted."
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2000). A person commits an illegal act if the person
knowingly
advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or in
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material
or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to
cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id.
112. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)(i).
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exploitation of actual - as opposed to virtual - children." 4 Congress
addressed this issue by expanding the affirmative defense to allow a
defendant to prove not only that the images are of youthful adult actors,
but also to include the alternate possibility of proving that the images were
"not produced using any actual minor or minors;" in other words, using
virtual minors." 5 However, this affirmative defense is not available to
those being prosecuted under the pandering provision of §
2252A(a)(3)(B)." 6
E. PROTECT Versus Ashcroft: ConstitutionalAnalysis
1. The Wolves are Gathering at the Door...
It is clearly just a matter of time before the constitutionality of
PROTECT is challenged. Already, the very same group that attacked the
CPPA is preparing an assault on PROTECT." 7 The question becomes:
How will the Justices respond when the issue is once again brought before
the U.S. Supreme Court?
2. Is the Supreme Court Likely to Uphold PROTECT?
We can be fairly certain that the late Chief Justice Rehnquist would
have upheld PROTECT, as would Justice Scalia, since they deferred to
18
Congress's findings and upheld the CPPA in its entirety in Ashcroft."
Justice Thomas would likely hold that PROTECT is constitutional as well,
since his primary concern in Ashcroft was that Congress could not show
that defendants had raised the virtual child pornography defense
successfully - something that Congress is now able to show. '19 Justice
O'Connor would have been the Justice most likely to uphold PROTECT's
ban on virtual child pornography, since she already concluded that

114. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2).
116. See generally id. § 2252A(c).
117. This is according to Paul Cambria, the attorney whom Larry Flynt called "probably the
best obscenity lawyer in America." Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Adult Entertainmentand
the FirstAmendment: A DialogueandAnalysis with the Industry's Leading Litigator& Appellate
Advocate, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 147 (2004). In an interview with the co-directors of the
Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at Pennsylvania State University, Cambria
acknowledged that he has been approached for the purpose of attacking PROTECT by the same
attorney who attacked the CPPA in Ashcroft, and he in fact suspects that they will do so. Id. at 167.
118. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 260.
119. Id. at 259; see also S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4 (2003).
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Congress's findings established a compelling government interest in
Ashcroft. Additionally, the changes that Congress made in PROTECT
were taken directly from suggestions in her concurrence. 20 Unfortunately,
none of these four Justices will cast the deciding vote when PROTECT is
challenged. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor are no longer
members of the Court, and at the time of this writing it is too early to
predict how their replacements will vote. Even assuming that their votes
would be the same, at least one Justice who voted with the majority in
Ashcroft will have to be convinced that the concerns they voiced in
Ashcroft have been satisfied. For the following reasons, the government
will be hard pressed to so convince the deciding Justice.
3. The Ashcroft Majority
While the new narrower definition of virtual child pornography is
better than the CPPA version, it probably does not go far enough to satisfy
the Ashcroft majority.12 ' Congress seems to have forgotten that the
Ashcroft majority did not consider virtual images to be unprotected speech
at all unless they were obscene. 2 2 The majority recognized that the Ferber
standard extended to non-obscene child pornography but specifically
refused to extend the standard to encompass a ban on virtual child
pornography, because the interest that supported the ban in Ferbersimply
did not exist regarding virtual images. 123 Likewise, under the new
definition, graphic, sexually explicit conduct can encompass pornographic
virtual images of young people that are not necessarily obscene. 124 The
120. Justice O'Connor's main concern was that the CPPA would extend its ban to youthfuladult pornography, which is clearly protected by the First Amendment. The use of the words
"virtually indistinguishable from" a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, to describe
completely computer-generated images, was exactly the interpretation that Justice O'Connor felt
should have saved the constitutionality of the CPPA definition. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 264; see also
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2003).
121. The ACLU raised this issue in its letter to Senator Leahy prior to enactment of
PROTECT. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 30.
122. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246.
123. As the majority pointed out in Ashcroft, "[t]hese images do not involve, let alone harm,
any children in the production process." The majority was equally unwilling to accept the
secondary effects argument to establish that the harm to children is just as great despite the images
being virtual. Id. at 241, 251-52.
124. At first it might seem hard to imagine that any image of a child engaged in graphic sexually
explicit conduct would not be considered obscene. However, most people think of child pornography
as involving only preadolescent children. We forget that images of teenagers over the age of sixteen
also fall under the heading of child pornography, but many communities do not forbid children that
age from engaging in sexual activity or even marrying. Therefore, such images would fail the
community standards prong of the Miller test. See, e.g., LANNING, supra note 5, at 12.
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majority has already ruled on this issue in Ashcroft, and it is highly
unlikely that they will change their minds this time around.
It is equally unlikely that the majority will find the hindering
prosecution argument to be a sufficiently compelling interest to uphold a
complete ban of virtual child pornography under the new statute. The
majority dismissed this argument as unpersuasive in Ashcroft and gave no
indication that if it were proved that prosecutions are actually being
hindered, as opposed to mere conjecture that they may be hindered in the
future, this would change its analysis at all.'25 The bottom line for the
majority, right or wrong, was that you simply cannot ban unprotected
speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled
in the process. 12 6 How can Congress expect the majority to accept the
hindering prosecution argument as its sole justification for banning virtual
child pornography when the majority has already
said that doing so would
127
down?'
upside
Amendment
First
the
"turn...
Congress would have to hope that the more complete affirmative
defense in the new statute would save the statute from the majority's
objections to this argument. However, while the majority may have left
open the idea that a statute might be saved by a more complete affirmative
defense, 128 that does not necessarily make it a done deal. The majority
expressed its general disapproval of shifting the burden to the defendant
to prove that his speech is not unlawful, stating that doing so "raises
serious constitutional difficulties.' ' 129 The implication of this statement is
that the government would have to make a very compelling argument in
order to overcome those "serious constitutional difficulties."
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that the government would succeed, since
the evidentiary issues that the majority took exception to in Ashcroft
continue to be issues in the current statute. 30

125. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255.
126. Whether or not the majority was correct in their analysis in Ashcroft, there is little reason
to believe that they will change their minds with regard to PROTECT. See supratext and citations
in Part III.C.4.
127. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255.
128. See id. at 256.
129. Id. at 255.
130. The ACLU called attention to this problem as well in their letter to Senator Leahy. It gave
as an example the fact that, according to the Ashcroft majority, anyone who was not the original
producer of a work may have no way of establishing the identity or existence of the actors, a
requirement under the CPPA's affirmative defense provision. This burden is not made any lighter
under PROTECT's affirmative defense provision, which allows the possessor or distributor further
down the distribution chain to prove that the material is 100% computer-generated. See ACLU
Letter, S. REP. No. 108-2, at 33 (2003).
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Finally, PROTECT's new pandering provision is also unlikely to
withstand constitutional challenge. Removing the pandering provision
from the definitions section and setting it apart in its own separate
provision was a step in the right direction,' 3' but the new provision in no
way addresses the concern that protected speech is being banned based not
on what is depicted, but merely on how it is presented.' In fact, the
provision refers not only to its actual material but also to "purported"
material that is pandered as child pornography, which could very well
mean that it is criminalizing the pandering of materials that do not exist at
' Clearly these are problems that would leave this provision wide open
all. 33
to a successful overbreadth challenge.
4. The Sobering Truth
As the foregoing analysis suggests, the future of PROTECT looks grim.
Any arguments that the government might have when PROTECT is
challenged have already been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Ashcroft. How then can Congress enact a law that protects our children
from child pornographers and pedophiles while at the same time satisfying
the Court's First Amendment concerns?

131. Recall that the original pandering provision was contained in the definition of child
pornography, which meant that anyone who possessed otherwise lawful material would be
committing a felony if the material had been unlawfully promoted earlier in the distribution chain.
See Ashcrofi, 535 U.S. at 242 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (1996)).
132. In the words of the Ashcroft majority, "While the legislative findings address at length
the problems posed by materials that look like child pornography, they are silent on the evils posed
by images simply pandered that way." See id. at 257.
133. Senator Leahy expressed his concern with the inclusion of the word "purported" despite
the fact that he co-sponsored the bill, stating with regard to the pandering provision, "It is not meant
to federally criminalize talking dirty over the Internet or the telephone when the person never
possesses any material at all. That is speech, and that goes too far." S. REP. No. 108-2, at 24. The
ACLU also found this language problematic and gave this example to show how absurd the results
of including this language might be:
If someone offered to provide you with a copy of Disney's Snow White, but
represented to you that it contained scenes of obscene child pornography, that
person will have committed a crime, punishable by a fine and up to fifteen years
in prison, even though Snow White is clearly material protected under the First
Amendment.
Id. at 32.
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V. BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD
A. Attempted Possession
One commentator'34 has suggested taking the issue of virtual child
pornography out of the realm of the First Amendment altogether, by using
existing federal law that penalizes attempted possession of child
pornography.'35 Under this scenario, child pornography possession is
attempted when the possessor knows or believes he possesses child
pornography portraying an actual child, regardless of whether the materials
in his possession are in fact of an actual child.'36 While an attempt
conviction requires a substantial step toward commission of the crime,
actual possession of an image that is "virtually indistinguishable" from
child pornography involving a real child should be sufficient to constitute
that substantial step.137 Finally, even though it is impossible to complete
the crime of possession of real child pornography if the image is virtual,
this cannot be used as a defense under federal law, since it makes no
difference why the attempt failed. If the elements of attempt are present,
a crime has been committed.' 38
While at first glance this solution makes sense, further analysis reveals
that it would not adequately address the problem. Attempted possession of
virtual child pornography is not the same as attempted possession of, for
example, a narcotic. A possessor who is charged with attempted
possession of a narcotic, which in actuality is talcum powder purchased
during a sting operation, would be hard pressed to convince a jury that he
really meant to purchase talcum powder since the talcum powder itself has
little value to the possessor. However, it would not be a stretch to convince
a jury that virtual child pornography in itself can be valuable to a
possessor, particularly if the images are non-obscene images of older teens

134. Timothy J. Perla, Attempting to End the Cycle of Virtual PornographyProhibitions,83
B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1231 (2003). In Perla's opinion, attempted possession can do the work of a
separate federal statute but with less baggage.
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (2003). "Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to
violate, subsection (a)(5) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned" (emphasis added).
136. According to Perla, this should not present any novel evidentiary problems. Belief can
be proven circumstantially and proving a defendant's beliefs is something that prosecutors must
accomplish in any specific intent crime. Perla, supra note 134, at 1232.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1233 (citing United States v. Brantley, 777 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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engaged in sexual activity. 3 9 The result is the same evidentiary problem
that has been hindering prosecutions since Ashcroft, only now all that the
defendant will have to say is that he believed the images were virtual. 40
B. Stop Wasting Time and Resources
Another commentator has suggested that Congress should stop
attempting to ban virtual child pornography altogether, because the time
and energy spent passing suspect legislation diverts valuable resources that
can otherwise produce visible results in the fight against actual child
pornography. 4 ' For example, federal funds should be increased to fund the
FBI's Innocent Images Initiative, a program which identifies and
investigates individuals who use the Internet to exploit children and which
has been successful in cracking down on individuals who transmit and
exchange child pornography. 4 2 Funding should also be increased for the
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force, a department that has helped
train several thousand prosecutors and investigators involved with
combating child exploitation and that has also provided direct investigative
assistance in more than three thousand cases involving individuals who
allegedly use the Internet to commit child pornography crimes.'4 3
Additionally, more resources should be allocated to the creation of an FBI
database of images already known to be of real children, thereby
facilitating the prosecution of those who possess the images farther down
the distribution chain.'
These are noble objectives. However, it does not seem that legislating
against virtual child pornography and allocating resources to the
aforementioned programs have to be mutually exclusive. For example,
while the legislature has been focusing its efforts on banning virtual child
pornography, the Department of Homeland Security has simultaneously

139. As the majority pointed out in Ashcroft, "Pictures of what appear to be 17-year-olds
engaging in sexually explicit activity do not in every case contravene community standards."
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002).
140. Even Perla intimated that if a possessor is able to convince a jury that he believed the
images were virtual, then the possessor would have to be found not guilty. If the culpability element
of the crime of attempted possession is not satisfied, the person is not guilty of attempted
possession. Perla, supra note 134, at 1234.
141. Jasmin J. Farhangian, A Problemof "Virtual" Proportions:The Difficulties Inherent in
TailoringVirtual ChildPornographyLawsto Meet ConstitutionalStandards,12 J.L. & POL'Y 24 1,
279 (2003).
142. Id. at 279-80.
143. Id. at 281.
144. Id.
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been creating a child image database just like the one referenced above.'45
Likewise, the Innocent Images Initiative has been experiencing a great
deal of success and does not seem to have been hampered by Congress's
focus on virtual child pornography legislation. 4 6 Unless it becomes clear
that there is no way at all to ban virtual child pornography through
legislation, Congress should not give up simply because there are
government programs fighting a similar battle.
C. It's "Miller" Time!
Perhaps the answer to this problem has been under Congress's nose all
along: link the ban of virtual child pornography to obscenity laws since
obscenity does not enjoy First Amendment protection. 147 It is the route
recommended by the majority of commentators. 4 ' It is also the route that
Congress attempted to follow in the first place when PROTECT was in its
infancy.149 The Ashcroft Court alluded to it in explaining why the CPPA
failed to pass constitutional muster. 50 The NCMEC, leading experts on
child sexual exploitation, went so far as to state that, in their view, 99100% of all child pornography would be found to be obscene by most

145. As of July 2003, children in roughly 300 images have been identified and the information
has been provided to law enforcement agencies throughout the country. FACT SHEET: OPERATION
PREDATOR, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, July 9, 2003, availableat http://www.dhs.
gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content-- 1067&print=true (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
146. Between FY 1996 and FY 2003 (2nd Quarter), the Innocent Images National Initiative
has recorded the following statistical accomplishments: Number of Cases Opened: 9,366; Number
of Informations/Indictments: 2,520; Number of Arrests/Locates/Summons: 2,608; Number of
Convictions/Pretrial Diversions: 2,569. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS PUBLICATIONS, INNOCENT IMAGES NATIONAL INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/innocent.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
147. See supraPart IA.
148. See, e.g., Virginia F. Milstead, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: How Can VirtualChild
PornographyBe Banned Under the FirstAmendment?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 825 (2004); Kate Dugan,
Regulating What's Not Real: Federal Regulation in the Aftermath of Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1063 (2004); Lyndall Schuster, Regulating Virtual Child
Pornographyin the Wake ofAshcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 429 (2002).
149. Senator Leahy, the co-sponsor of PROTECT, voiced his concern about the changes made
to PROTECT that de-linked it from obscenity law. For example, with regard to the pandering
provision, "[T]he decision to obviate the need to demonstrate any relation to obscenity places the
constitutionality ofthe provision as a whole at risk." The bottom line for Senator Leahy would have
been to simply outlaw "obscene" child pornography of all types, an approach that would require
no affirmative defense and would pass constitutional muster under established U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. See S. REP. No. 108-2, at 23-24 (2003).
150. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002).
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judges and juries.' 5 ' Even Paul Cambria, the champion of5 the
adult
2
entertainment industry, alluded to obscenity law as an answer.1
So why not use Millerand end all of the constitutional wrangling once
and for all? Any image (virtual or real, digital or photograph) that would
appeal to the prurient interest, is patently offensive in light of community
standards, and lacks scientific, literary, artistic, or political value, would
be subject to government regulation.' 53 Movies like "American Beauty"
and "Traffic" would be safe. Great works of art would be safe. It is
difficult to imagine a community that would not find obscene images of
children engaged in sexual acts patently offensive.' 54
The problem is that Miller does not extend to the private possession of
obscenity in the home. Obscene virtual child pornography does not fall
into the same category as actual child pornography, the mere possession
of which is able to be constitutionally prohibited based on the Court's
decision in Osborne.'55 Private possession of obscene material is covered
by the Court's decision in Stanley, which specifically found government
regulation of what a person possesses in his own home to be an
unconstitutional intrusion on the fundamental right to privacy. 156 By
leaving out the possibility of penalizing the possessor of virtual child
pornography, we end up back where we started: defendants using the
virtual child pornography defense to hinder prosecutions for possession of
actual child pornography.

151. This is even true under the community standards model. As Daniel Armagh, Director of
the Legal Resource Division for the NCMEC expressed, "In my experience there has never been
a visual depiction of child pornography that did not meet the constitutional requirements for
obscenity." NCMEC, Letter from NCMEC, to Senator Patrick Leahy (Oct. 17, 2002), S. REP. No.
108-2, at 28.
152. In Cambria's view, where the Free Speech argument breaks down is "where the conduct
really starts flying off the meter." Calvert & Richards, supranote 117, at 152.
153. See supra Part IA.
154. No, pedophiles would not be able to form "communities" to create their own community
standards. According to the Miller Court,
the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of 'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards' is to be certain that, so far
as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an
average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person - or
indeed a totally insensitive one.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) (emphasis added).
155. See supra Part TB.
156. See supra Part IA.

REAL PROBLEMS, VIRTUAL SOLUTIONS: THE (STILL) UNCERTAIN FUTURE

VI. CONCLUSION

Clearly there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problem of virtual
child pornography.
However, what we as a society cannot afford to do is lose sight of the
real issue: the protection of our children. Of course we do not want to see
the First Amendment protections that are so vital to our existence as a free
nation become watered down and meaningless. On the other hand, neither
should we strive to live in a society where anything goes no matter how
morally repugnant and no matter how many innocent lives are affected.
Therefore, all parties involved need to agree upon a compromise.
A reasonable compromise would be for Congress to enact a statute that
links a ban on virtual child pornography to the Miller standard and to stop
trying to force the issue when it comes to virtual images of young adults.
This would address both the Court's desire to protect works of literary and
artistic merit and its belief that teenage sexuality should be accepted as a
fact of modem society. In return the U.S. Supreme Court should carve out
an exception to existing obscenityjurisprudence by extending the Osborne
holding to not only encompass a ban on possession of actual child
pornography, but on obscene virtual child pornography as well.
It is not unreasonable to ask the Court to reaffirm its belief that
protecting our children is an interest that outweighs the right to possess
images of minimal First Amendment value. Stanley may have stood for the
proposition that the right to privacy prohibits governmental regulation of
what a person possesses in his own home, but, as the Court later stated in
Osborne, "Stanley itself emphasized that we did not 'mean to express any
opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed,
filmed, or recorded materials... In such cases, compelling reasons may
exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess those
materials."" 5 7 If individuals can continue to legally possess obscene
virtual child pornography, the price that we as a society will pay is far too
high. The virtual child pornography defense will continue to hinder
prosecutions of those charged with actual child pornography offenses.
Child molesters will continue to use child pornography, actual or virtual,
to lure children into sexual activity. If even one guilty possessor of actual
child pornography goes free, or even one child is lured into sexual activity
by a child molester, that is one too many. Both scenarios should create an
interest compelling enough to justify extending Osborne to criminalize

157. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1989) (citation omitted).
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possession of obscene virtual child pornography. Our children deserve that
much.

